Dr. Marcus Michaelsen, senior researcher at the University of Toronto-based Citizen Lab, said in an interview with the Stockholm Center for Freedom (SCF) that understanding transnational repression through digital technologies was essential for safeguarding vulnerable communities and democratic values.
“Transnational repression, particularly its digital forms, has become a growing concern due to several developments that have changed how authoritarian states reach beyond their borders to control and silence dissent among political exiles and diaspora communities,” he told SCF.
As part of SCF’s interview series “Freedom Talks,” research director Dr. Merve R. Kayıkcı interviewed Dr. Michaelsen about digital transnational methods repressive regimes employ to silence dissidents abroad.
Dr. Michaelsen is a researcher studying digital technologies, human rights activism and authoritarian politics. His ongoing work centers on digital transnational repression and the ways authoritarian regimes use digital technologies to extend political control and repression across borders.
He is currently working as senior researcher for the Citizen Lab in projects on digital transnational repression.
Dr. Michaelsen has a PhD in Media and Communication Studies from the University of Erfurt in Germany (2012) and a Master’s in Middle Eastern Studies from the Université de Provence Aix-Marseille in France (2003).
He grew up in East Berlin, and the fall of the wall remains a defining moment of his life. In his own words, the sudden opening and the fundamental change after 1989 instilled an enthusiasm for exploration in him and a profound respect for all those who resist dictatorship.
Why has transnational repression — and more specifically digital transnational repression — become a growing concern in today’s world, and what impact does it have on dissidents around the globe?
Transnational repression, particularly its digital forms, has become a growing concern due to several developments that have changed how authoritarian states reach beyond their borders to control and silence dissent among political exiles and diaspora communities. Transnational repression is in fact a response of these governments to globalization and the increasing flows of information and migration. As more and more people move to other countries, for political and economic reasons, they stay connected to their home countries with the help of digital technologies. They continue to participate in social and political debates. Using the ties that link them to their country of origin, they can mobilize for political change from afar and raise international awareness on human rights violations, corruption and power abuse by the home state. In response to such forms of transnational activism, authoritarian governments extend domestic political controls across borders to control political expression, dissent and mobilization in the diaspora and among political exiles. They can use the same digital technologies to surveil, intimidate and threaten critics and opponents who live in other countries. The impact on the targeted individuals and communities is profound and multifaceted. Digital transnational repression can draw them back under the control of the repressive home state, reproducing a climate of fear, oppression and insecurity which they tried to escape by moving to another country.
Can you tell us what we mean by digital technologies in the context of transnational repression? What role do digital technologies play in enabling or expanding transnational repression?
Digital technologies enabling transnational repression encompass information and communication tools such as the internet, social media or spyware. With the help of these technologies, repressive regimes can control criticism and dissent in diaspora communities on a much wider scale. They can monitor political expression and mobilization on social media, collect intimate information on activists’ contacts and communications with the help of invasive surveillance technologies, and rapidly mount defamation and disinformation campaigns that smear the reputation of journalists and human rights defenders or promote regime narratives, drowning and undermining other critical views. In addition, digital threats are often intertwined with other forms of transnational repression, such as threats against family members in the home country, physical harassment and even killing attempts.
How has the internet changed the dynamics of authoritarian control over diasporas and exiled dissidents and in your opinion, are there any particular tools that have proven especially vulnerable to misuse?
By using the mentioned tactics, authoritarian regimes can respond much faster to any activity they perceive as a challenge to their power, while controlling a wider range of people. The scalability of digital attacks means that entire diaspora communities can be targeted simultaneously, rather than focusing on individual high-profile dissidents. This broader reach spreads fear and uncertainty throughout exile communities, effectively silencing not just direct targets but also their supporters and contacts. In addition, digital threats require [fewer] resources than, for example, sending spies or security agents to other countries.
Among the most impactful tools of digital transnational repression is commercial spyware that is sold to repressive regimes on a thriving and opaque global market and allows them to secretly infiltrate the smartphones of people independent from their location, gaining access to the most intimate details of their personal lives. Also, social media platforms provide a fertile ground for online harassment, smear campaigns and defamation against activists.
In your opinion, what psychological or social impacts does digital transnational repression have on individuals and communities in exile? Does the fear of digital surveillance change the behavior of activists, journalists or academics living in democratic countries?
The effects of digital transnational repression on the targeted individuals and communities are severe and far-reaching. Surveillance and online harassment affect the mental health and wellbeing of people who often report stress, paranoia, depression and burnout. They reduce contacts to families and friends and experience social isolation because fear and mistrust seep into online and diaspora communities. Targets also practice self-censorship, or withdraw entirely from activism. Smear campaigns and disinformation can impact their professional contacts and careers.
You’ve also explored the gendered dimensions of digital transnational repression. For a general audience, can you explain what this involves and why it’s important to consider gender when analyzing transnational repression?
In our recent study for the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, our team interviewed more than 80 women human rights defenders from 24 countries of origin residing in 23 host countries. We found that exiled and diaspora women human rights defenders targeted through digital transnational repression face not only the same digital threats as men human rights defenders, but also gender-specific forms of online harassment, abuse and intimidation. These threats lead to disproportionate harms that range from professional setbacks, stigmatization and social isolation to the erosion of intimate relationships, profound emotional distress and psychological trauma. Gender-based digital transnational repression also frequently exploits entrenched patriarchal norms around women’s bodies, sexuality, behavior and notions of family honor. Authoritarian regimes instrumentalize these norms and misogynist ideas to shame and intimidate politically engaged women and to push them out of public space.
In your recent study, you examine how the type of government and regional ties in host countries affect how transnational repression is carried out. Can you walk us through your key findings and explain why the host country’s political context is so important?
In an article that I co-authored together with Kris Ruijgrok from the University of Amsterdam we examined how the regime type of the host country and the regional ties between the host and origin country influence the likelihood and type of transnational repression incidents. Based on the Freedom House data on physical acts of transnational repression, we find that in most cases of physical transnational repression, the perpetrators seek the cooperation of host state authorities as this brings less costs, attention and reputational damage. We show that the likelihood of transnational repression incidents that involve some sort of cooperation between the home and host state of exiles is higher in countries that are ruled by authoritarian governments. A shared disregard for human rights and a weak rule of law mean that authorities collaborate more readily in cases of politically motivated extradition requests or forced repatriation. Sometimes exiles also fall victim to higher-ranking political interests and shifting priorities. Turkey for some time provided an important sanctuary for Uyghurs fleeing the repression against their people in the Xinjiang region. This changed when the government of President Erdogan established closer relations with China and began to arbitrarily detain Uyghurs and threaten them with deportation.
In more democratic host states, on the other hand, the perpetrating governments find it more difficult to get authorities to cooperate. The rule of law and the guarantee of fundamental rights and asylum procedures establish a layer of protection for exiled dissidents. One consequence is that regimes resort to subtle methods like digital threats and the harassment of home-country families. But there are still cases when authoritarian governments perceive exiles as threatening enough to justify the costs and potential repercussions of a direct physical attack, for instance against high-profile human rights defenders or former regime insiders.
Where do you see this issue headed in the next five to 10 years, especially with the rise of AI, facial recognition and big data?
We will certainly still see practices of digital transnational repression increasing as authoritarian rulers feel more confident and emboldened to assert their power and advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) risk enhancing their capabilities, particularly in terms of surveillance and information manipulation. AI-powered surveillance systems process and analyze data on a large scale, inferring social ties and political opinions to map out and prepare attacks against activists and their networks. AI tools further facilitate disinformation production by generating false and misleading images, audio and text. Already now governments use automated accounts and deceitful information to manipulate online debates, silence critical voices and amplify pro-government views. The proliferation of these tactics due to accessible AI tools risks further harming activists and journalists targeted with digital repression. The impacts can be particularly severe for vulnerable groups such as women who are already disproportionately targeted by gendered digital violence and hostility, for example in the form of sexualized deepfake videos.
What research or policy areas do you think are most urgently in need of attention in this space?
Democratic governments in the countries where the targeted communities reside still need to do more to recognize transnational repression as a distinct threat to the human security of the diaspora members at risk, but also to their own sovereignty and democratic institutions. Transnational repression constitutes a systematic attempt of authoritarian states to silence dissent and curtail human rights in other countries. With their practices, these regimes consolidate and expand autocratic rule globally. Democratic governments need to counter it proactively. They can increase the costs for perpetrators and limit opportunities to threaten exiles and diasporas. They also need to safeguard and improve protection mechanisms for people at risk, both by respecting the right to asylum and establishing dedicated support mechanisms for targets of transnational repression. This can include awareness raising, training and cooperation across the different policy sectors potentially concerned by cases of transnational repression, such as foreign policy, security and migration. Another measure that diaspora groups at risk often demand is the establishment of a dedicated and easily accessible contact point that provides information and support to people who face threats of transnational repression.
Turkey has been increasingly cited in reports on transnational repression, particularly in its targeting of political dissidents abroad. How has Turkey used digital technologies to extend its surveillance and coercion beyond its borders, and what distinguishes its approach from that of other authoritarian states?
The Turkish government is a prolific perpetrator of transnational repression. In addition to physical threats such as assaults and renditions, the government relies on a number of digital tactics to intimidate, harass and silence dissidents, journalists and other critics in the diaspora. A common method seems to mobilize troll networks affiliated with the ruling party to systematically threaten opposition voices on social media platforms. Turkish state actors have reportedly also used automated bot accounts, retweet rings and inauthentic accounts to spread disinformation and attack opponents on social media platforms. There are also attempts to outsource surveillance to diaspora members who support the government and report critics to authorities in Turkey. Such tactics obviously spread uncertainty and self-censorship among those diaspora members who still travel to their home country and fear being interrogated or arrested upon arrival.
